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FLORIDA COURT REFUSES TO
EXTEND PROTECTION OF STATE
U.C.C. STATUTE AND
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY
ACT TO LESSEES OF DEFECTIVE
VEHICLE
In Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526
So.2d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the Florida
District Court of Appeals for the First District
held that neither § 672.608 of Florida's commercial code, Fla. Stat. § 672.608 (1983) (corresponding to § 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial
Code), nor the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2308 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986),
apply to a closed-end lease of a defective motor
vehicle when there is no intent to transfer title.
The court of appeals thus affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment order in favor of the
defendant.
Background
Pursuant to a December 28, 1983, "Retail
Lease Agreement" ("the agreement") with Frank
Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc. ("Frank Griffin"), Timothy and Kristi Sellers accepted possession of a
new Jeep Cherokee. Frank Griffin subsequently
assigned the lease agreement to American Credit
Corporation ("AMCC"). Several days later, according to the Sellers, the motor exploded.The
explosion sent portions of the Jeep's engine
through the engine block and the Sellers were
forced to take the Jeep in for repairs. Over the
course of the following months, additional vehicle defects appeared, including leaks in the passenger compartment, inaccurate readings on
certain gauges, "warm" air conditioning, and
faulty brakes.
In November 1984, the Sellers attempted to
return the defective Jeep to Frank Griffin. The
dealer refused to accept it. The Sellers sued
Frank Griffin and AMCC for a refund of their
down payment, all monies paid to AMCC, consequential damages, and attorneys' fees. The
couple also sought revocation of acceptance of
the Jeep under § 672.608 of the Florida statute
and under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
("the Magnuson-Moss Act" or "the Act"). In
essence, § 672.608 of the Florida statute allows a
buyer to revoke acceptance of defective goods

if a defect substantially impairs the value of the
goods. The Magnuson-Moss Act mandates warranty protection for consumers acquiring goods
from suppliers.
In their complaint, the Sellers alleged that the
agreement was a "transaction in goods" within
the definition of § 672.102 of the Florida statute.
The Sellers further alleged that Frank Griffin
failed to correct the vehicle's defects and that
the value of the vehicle was thereby decreased.
Finally, the Sellers alleged that Frank Griffin had
breached both implied and express warranties
in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
The trial court rejected the Sellers' argument
that either the Florida statute or the MagnusonMoss Act applies to a closed-end lease of a vehicle in which the lessees have no option to purchase the vehicle. The court held that both the
Florida statute and the Magnuson-Moss Act
apply only to sales transactions, and that the
agreement between the parties was not a sales
transaction. In holding that the transaction was
not a sale, the trial court relied primarily on the
absence of an option to purchase in the agreement and the lack of passage of title. The court
granted summary judgment for Frank Griffin
without addressing the warranty issues presented in the complaint.
Statutory Protection Extends Only to Sales
The appellate court noted that chapter 672 of
the Florida Statutes applies to transactions in
goods "unless the context otherwise requires.... " 526 So. 2d at 150. On appeal, the

Sellers argued for a liberal construction of the
statute, and contended that the lease of the vehicle was a "transaction in goods." In spite of
Florida's strong public policy favoring a broad
interpretation of the statute's sales provisions to
provide meaningful remedies to purchasers of
defective cars, the trial court had refused to
extend coverage of § 672.608 to the transaction
between the parties.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court first reasoned that § 672.608 refers
explicitly to sales. Pursuant to § 672.401, a "sale"
is defined as "the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price." 526 So.2d at 150. The
court next observed that although Florida courts
had not done so, courts in other jurisdictions
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treated certain lease transactions as subject to
part 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code
when certain elements of a sale are present. In
deciding whether a transaction issubject to part
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, courts from
other jurisdictions found the following factors
relevant: whether the sum of the rental payments will amortize the value, with interest, of
the goods being rented; whether the term of the
lease covers the useful life of the goods; whether
there is an option to purchase the goods at the
end of the lease for a nominal price; whether
the lessee is responsible for damage or loss,
insurance coverage, repairs, and replacement of
parts; and whether the lessee isrequired to pay a
license fee, security deposit, or taxes.
The court examined the "Retail Buyer's Order"
together with the agreement and concluded
that the transaction between the Sellers and
Frank Griffin possessed elements characteristic
of both a sale and a lease. Like a sale, the sum of
the Sellers' rental payments would amortize
most of the Jeep's value, virtually matching the
purchase price noted in the Retail Buyer's Order.
In addition, the Sellers had paid all expenses
related to vehicle ownership as if they had
bought the vehicle outright. On the other hand,
like a lease, the agreement contained no option
for purchase, although the Sellers argued that

TRUTH-IN-ADVERTISING LAW
PROHIBITS ANTI-ABORTION
GROUP FROM ADVERTISING AS
ABORTION INFORMATION
SERVICE
In Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North
Texas, Inc. v. State of Texas, 749 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.
109 S.Ct.
Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S.
2431 (1989), the Texas Court of Appeals held that
an anti-abortion organization violated the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act ("the Act"), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§
17.41-17.826 (Vernon 1987), by advertising as an
abortion information service and then subjecting its unwitting clients to graphic depictions of
abortion procedures. The court held that even
though the clinic did not actually sell medical
services, it engaged in trade or commerce as
defined by the Act.
-,

the parties previously had agreed to an option
for purchase at the end of the lease period.
Ultimately, the court relied upon the clear,
unambiguous language of the agreement which
expressly stated and restated that the agreement
was one of lease rather than sale. The court held
that there had been no transfer of title and thus
no "sale;" therefore, the agreement was not
covered by § 672.608.
Next, the court addressed the Sellers' claim
under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The court recognized that the Act was intended to provide
broad protection to consumers, but noted that
§ 2301 of the Act expressly limits its application
to a recognized sale and purchase transaction
between a "supplier" and "a buyer.. .of any
consumer product." 526 So. 2d at 156. The court
reasoned that the Act therefore applies only to a
sale of goods, or to a lease of goods that is substantially connected to a sale or purchase of
goods. As the court had already determined, the
transaction between Frank Griffin and the Sellers
was a pure lease transaction. Extending the Act
to pure lease transactions, cautioned the court,
isan activity better left to the legislature. Accordingly, the court held that the warranty provisions
of the Magnuson-Moss Act did not apply to the
agreement.
Elizabeth A. Mitchell

Background
From 1984 through 1986, Mother & Unborn
Baby Care of North Texas, Inc., ("the Center")
placed advertisements for free pregnancy testing under "Abortion Information & Services"
and "Clinics-Medical" in the Yellow Pages of
the telephone directory. The organization operated under other names, including the Problem
Pregnancy Center and Abortion Action Affiliates Problem Pregnancy Center. A large number of women telephoned the Center requesting abortions. By giving evasive answers to
requests for information, the Center misled the
women into believing that it was an abortion
clinic. Consequently, many of the women scheduled appointments.
After arriving at the Center, a woman typically
gave the staff personal medical information and
submitted a urine sample for a free pregnancy

